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More “Vitiating Paradoxes”: 
A Response to Steven D. Smith 
Paul Horwitz* 
INTRODUCTION 
If I were to select a candidate for Legal Theory Trends That Should 
Have Been, one of my first nominees would be Conservative Critical Legal 
Studies.  The list of key practitioners in the field would, I admit, be tiny.  
But one of its most honored members would be Steven D. Smith.1 
Of course there is something puckish in this description.  The positions 
Smith argues for, or at least treats as worthy of consideration, are not usually 
associated with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which is 
generally assumed, both in the popular imagination and by many of its less 
supple academic fans, to be entirely a creature of the Left.2  But at least a 
few observers have long understood that the CLS approach, while it may be 
intrinsically radical, is not intrinsically tied to the Left.3  
In particular, two central CLS themes—the “identification, in numerous 
substantive areas of law, of paired oppositions and standard arguments 
deploying sets of claims from one side of those oppositions against sets 
 
 *  Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.  I am grateful to Rick 
Garnett for comments.  I have learned from Steven D. Smith for years, as a reader, friend, and 
briefly as a visiting professor at his home base, the University of San Diego School of Law.  I cannot 
express strongly enough my personal and professional admiration for him.  Any errors in this piece 
are, of course, his alone. 
 1.  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  Smith is 
also the co-director of both the Institute for Law & Religion and the Institute for Law & Philosophy 
at USD. 
 2.  See generally Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 
(1991). 
 3.  In his “political history” of the CLS movement, however, Mark Tushnet writes that CLS, 
rather than cohering around a set of key propositions, is (or was) simply “a political location for a 
group of people on the Left who share the project of supporting and extending the domain of the Left 
in the legal academy.”  Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1516.  “On this view,” he adds, “the project of 
critical legal studies does not have any essential intellectual component.”  Id. 
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drawn from the other side,”4 with the inevitable effect of destabilizing or 
heightening the visible contradictions in those sets,5 and the related sense of 
“alienation from, or as expressed within, the legal system”6—are no political 
side’s sole preserve.  To the extent that a common, or key, CLS move is to 
“recast the assertions of mainstream scholars as doubts,”7 or to “take 
mainstream claims one at a time, severing them from their fluid 
interrelationship with their negation in mainstream work, and extend them 
seriously until they succeed or collapse”8—usually the latter—nothing 
requires that move to end in a particular political location (or to end at all). 
During CLS’s prime, few people focused on this fact.  Many members 
of the Left were eager to claim Critical Legal Studies for themselves;9 many 
members of the Right were eager to pin it on the Left; and most members of 
both sides were unable to see beyond their own particular political 
moment.10  But some did recognize it.11  Thus, in 1991 Sanford Levinson 
pointed out “the possibility that the label Critical Legal Studies, if it evokes 
a certain way of understanding law, may lend itself just as easily to a right-
wing argument as to the leftish ones identified with it.”12 
In the same article, Levinson pointed out that ideas are subject to 
“ideological drift,” which occurs when “positions identified at a particular 
moment in history with a given political stance, come at a later point to be 
 
 4.  Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1524. 
 5.  Cf. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 295 
(Stanley Katz ed., 2009) (characterizing the work of Roberto Unger and Duncan Kennedy) (“[L]aw, 
both as pedestrian doctrine and as high theory, was riven with contradictory rules, policies, and 
imperatives.  CLS thinkers viewed these contradictions as structural and incapable of intellectually 
respectable resolution . . . .”). 
 6.  Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1525.  
 7.  David Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 12 GERMAN L.J. 338, 350 
(2011). 
 8.  Id. at 350–51. 
 9.  See E. Dana Neacsu, CLS Stands for Critical Legal Studies, If Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & 
POL’Y 415 (2000). 
 10.  See generally id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical Legal 
Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221, 1252 (1991) (book 
review).  He adds: “As Robin West has recently reminded us, . . . ‘legal instrumentalism,’ a view 
that can easily be linked with the CLS critique of legal formalism, ‘can be put to either radical, 
liberal, or conservative political ends.’”  Id. at 1251–52 (quoting Robin West, Progressive and 
Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 661 (1990)).  
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identified with quite different stances.”13  We might currently be 
experiencing just such a moment of ideological drift.  A high consciousness 
of the contradictory nature of law and its standard moves, and a strong sense 
of alienation from legal culture, are reactions that might come today from a 
very different part of the political spectrum than in the 1980s. Today, that 
feeling may be especially conspicuous for members of illiberal groups, and 
those who share, belong to, or are sympathetic to the kinds of religious 
views and groups that face hostility from conventional legal liberal thinkers, 
or whose claims are given short shrift by the mainstream.14  There has 
always been a strain of Critical Legal Theory that carries a strong religious 
component.15  It should thus not be entirely surprising or out of the question 
that the banner of CLS, having mostly been dropped by the Left, might be 
picked up by some radically religious conservatives.16  If so, they would be 
well advised to start by reading Smith’s work. 
I do not mean to caricature or straitjacket Smith too much with this 
description.  At times, particularly early in his career, the kinship between 
Smith and CLS was clearer on its face, and appeared to involve something in 
the water in Colorado.17  But Smith has written much and well, and in a 
highly nuanced fashion, and I would be reluctant to lock him into a 
particular jurisprudential category or description.  I would be even more 
reluctant to attempt to categorize confidently his political or religious views.  
I do not think he would take offense, however, if I suggested that he is both 
politically and culturally conservative and deeply religious.  He is also a 
consummate observer, and heightener, of contradictions in church-state 
 
 13.  Id. at 1251 (citing J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to 
the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383 (1990)).  
 14.  See Gabriel Arana, “Religious Liberty”: The Next Big Front in the Culture Wars, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 8, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/religious-liberty-next-big-front-
culture-wars. 
 15.  See Peter Gabel, Critical Legal Studies as a Spiritual Practice, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 515, 528–
30 (2009) (emphasizing a strain of CLS that linked the indeterminacy critique of law to a deeper 
“spiritual and moral foundation,” and arguing that “CLS ‘stopped,’ or perhaps ‘paused,’ about 
fifteen years ago because it lost track of this spiritual and moral foundation”). 
 16.  See generally id. 
 17.  See, e.g., PAUL F. CAMPOS ET AL., AGAINST THE LAW (Neal Devins & Mark A. Graber eds., 
1996) (a CLS-inflected collection by Smith and two colleagues, all of whom taught at the University 
of Colorado’s law school at the time; it bears emphasis that the other authors did not necessarily 
share Smith’s ideological or religious views).  See also Levinson, supra note 12, at 1252 (suggesting 
that Robert Nagel, another Colorado colleague of Smith’s, might make up one of the very few 
members of the “right[ ]wing of Critical Legal Studies.”). 
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law.18  His Brandeis Lecture19 (like the book from which it is drawn)20 draws 
on some of these tensions or contradictions—what he eloquently calls 
“potentially vitiating paradox[es]”21—that threaten to “make religious 
freedom a vulnerable constitutional commitment,”22 especially in the face of 
“contemporary liberal egalitarianism.”23 
By coming unmoored from deeper religious views and rationales and 
coming to rest on the “logic of secular neutrality,” Smith suggests, religious 
freedom ends up “turn[ing] on and negat[ing] its own supporting rationales.  
It is like the snake that circles around and swallows itself by the tail.”24  It 
strangles itself, he says in Crit-like language, with its own “self-subverting 
logic.”25  Religious freedom is indeed in jeopardy.26  But not from the usual 
suspects—or what used to be the usual suspects and are still viewed as such 
in many liberal circles.27  Paradoxically, “the threat comes not so much from 
religious conservatives who reject constitutional commitments as . . . from 
secular egalitarians who purport to be carrying out the commands of the 
Constitution’s (self-subverting) commitment to religious freedom.”28  If 
religious freedom survives, at least as a legal matter, in the face of its own 
contradictions and tensions, it does so only because of the Supreme Court’s 
 
 18.  Although not the only one.  A similar spirit is present in Frederick Mark Gedicks’s fine 
book, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE (1995). 
 19.  Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903 (2014) 
 20.  See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2014) 
[hereinafter SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE]. 
 21.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 907. 
 22.  Id. at 906. 
 23.  Id. at 919. 
 24.  Id. at 907. 
 25.  Id.; see also SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 168 (“In the revised story [of 
American religious freedom,] religious freedom is being subverted by . . . religious freedom itself (as 
currently understood), which through its commitments to equality and neutrality and secular 
government has effectively deprived itself of its historical reasons for being.  Thus enfeebled, and 
faced with being flattened by the juggernaut of ‘equality,’ religious freedom’s long-term chances do 
not look promising.”). 
 26.  See Arana, supra note 14. 
 27.  I am less convinced that the mass of contemporary church-state legal scholars, of whatever 
political stripe, hold the view that Smith suggests is held by liberals in general—namely, that the 
primary threat to religious freedom comes from religious conservatives who would tear down the 
wall of separation between church and state and erect a Christian political-religious establishment in 
its place.  But it is certainly true that many generally educated political liberals believe just that. 
 28.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 11. 
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“flagrant inconsistency in adhering to announced doctrines.”29 
By setting out the problems with what he calls the “standard story” of 
American religious freedom,30 Smith clears space in which to offer up a 
“revised version of American religious freedom.”31  That version includes, 
quite prominently, an idea that has recently come into vogue among a set of 
American church-state scholars (myself included):32 a revival of “the 
classical commitment to freedom of the church,”33 which in the American 
version entails “a commitment to the churches’ autonomy from the state.”34  
Some scholars (myself more or less included) contend that freedom of the 
church best explains outcomes such as the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
decision upholding the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.35 
This is a hurried précis of a full and nuanced argument.  I have not 
covered every caveat or complexity.  Moreover, I have taken much from 
Smith’s excellent book that falls outside the scope of his lecture, which 
focuses more on the “potentially vitiating paradox[es]” that undermine 
modern American religious freedom than on freedom of the church as a 
preferable route to understanding and preserving American religious 
liberty.36  But what interests me at present is the relationship between 
Smith’s approach and what I take to be his preferred outcome.  In Smith’s 
critical account, the conventional version of American religious freedom 
suffers from tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes.37  The well-rehearsed 
defenses of this conventional version can only shore it up for so long.  
Perhaps it is better, then, to return to the more traditional “freedom of the 
 
 29.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 124. 
 30.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 1. 
 31.  Id. at 7. 
 32.  See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS ch.6 (2012); Paul Horwitz, Act 
III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 973 (2012); Paul Horwitz, Churches As First 
Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009); Paul 
Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049 (2013).  
 33.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 169. 
 34.  Id. at 70. 
 35.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 36.  But see Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 906–07 (summarizing the concept of 
“freedom of the church”). 
 37.  See e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 41 (2003). 
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church” version of religious freedom.38  That version would focus less on 
“justice” and more on “jurisdiction.”39  It would emphasize James Madison’s 
famous statement that religion is “a domain ‘wholly exempt from 
[government’s] cognizance.’”40  It would treat as central to American 
religious freedom the status of the church, and of individual religious 
conscience, as “a jurisdiction beyond the regulatory reach of this-worldly 
officials or authorities.”41 
I find much to admire in Smith’s ironic, gentle, relentless skepticism 
about the standard story of American religious freedom.  I am, to be sure, 
not entirely convinced by it.  I am not persuaded (and Smith does not quite 
argue) that arguments for religious freedom in a more secular age involve a 
necessary “vitiating paradox” in which, if “religion is wholly outside the 
state’s cognizance,” it “follow[s] that the state is precluded from acting on 
religious rationales.”42  I do not believe it is true, as a matter of law or of 
sound and still fairly conventional legal theory, that “the state cannot act on 
or endorse any religious views,” or that the limitations on the degree to 
which the state qua state can endorse religious views necessarily mean that 
it cannot continue fairly robustly along the path carved out by the “religious 
rationales . . . that produced the commitment to religious freedom in the first 
place.”43  I do believe the state itself, in an essentially official capacity, is 
precluded from making statements that consist of strong religious outputs: of 
strong statements about the truth or falsity of ultimate religious questions.  
But I do not believe this limitation precludes individual politicians from 
drawing in many instances on religious inputs—religious motivations, 
arguments, and sources—in deliberating on questions of public policy.44  
Still, the farthest I am willing to go in defending the input/ouput 
 
 38.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 170. 
 39.  Id. at 105. 
 40.  Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 
THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 309, 309 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 
2009)). 
 41.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 169. 
 42.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19 , at 907. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See generally PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2011) [hereinafter HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE].  Andrew Koppelman, at least as 
I understand his work, makes a similar distinction between religious inputs and outputs in describing 
and defending what he calls the “American” version of religious neutrality.  See generally ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013). 
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distinction is to conclude that it is mostly workable.  It is certainly not 
perfect.  It is subject to sound (but not, I hope, fatal) criticism at the level of 
theory and in particular borderline cases.45  In large measure, I owe my 
reluctance to say more than that this distinction (or other aspects of the 
doctrinal elements of the “standard” version of religious freedom law) is 
workable to Smith’s searching, critical explorations of the tensions in 
church-state law and theory.  Whether one accepts Smith’s “revised version” 
of American religious freedom is a separate question.46  But Smith makes a 
strong case for doubting that the “standard version” is the whole story or that 
it is completely sustainable in its present form—especially as religious 
freedom faces substantial pressure from powerful egalitarian impulses. 
What I wonder, though, when reading this Lecture and other 
provocative work by Smith, is where—if anywhere—the “potentially 
vitiating paradoxes” end.  A critical sensibility, once set loose, is not easily 
cabined.  Other tensions and seeming contradictions, perhaps an endless 
number, can always be found.  And although Smith’s work shows that the 
identification of tensions in standard doctrinal or theoretical legal moves47 
can serve the Right as well as the Left, the fact remains that this critical lens 
can point in either direction.48 
This is especially true for the Religion Clauses.  The perception of 
tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause may 
not be inevitable. As Smith says of the standard version of American 
 
 45.  See generally HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 44, at 120–21, 305-06 (concluding, 
after offering an “empathetic agnosticism” approach to the Religion Clauses, that even this approach 
is not immune from the underlying, built-in tensions that persist in the relationship between religion 
and the liberal state).  
 46.  I would describe myself as a fellow traveler with respect to freedom of the church rather 
than as a full adherent to Smith’s views.  I believe that churches and other religious organizations 
should enjoy a substantial measure of institutional autonomy under the law, but perhaps not for quite 
the same reasons as Smith and certainly not with all the same outcomes.  Happily, those differences 
are well outside the scope of this Response.  
 47.  I don’t think Smith’s critiques of standard views in law and religion would properly be 
termed as “trashing,” and I wouldn’t saddle them with that label, but they bear a fair resemblance to 
it.  See Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984) (defining “trashing” as follows: 
“Take specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually foolish 
([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer’s) order (not the germ of truth) in the 
internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we’ve exposed.”); see also Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. 
Mashburn, Jean-Luc Godard and Critical Legal Studies (Because We Need the Eggs), 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 1924, 1937 (1989) (describing the deconstructionist CLS method as “deconstructing or 
demystifying an area of law . . . to make its conceptual structures visible and bare to scrutiny”).  
 48.  See generally Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19. 
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religious freedom, the “self-subverting logic” of the Religion Clauses “is 
hardly inexorable.”49  But it is a common perception,50 and for good reason.51  
Attempts to ease that tension, or simply to reach what the writer thinks is a 
sound interpretation of one or the other clause, by treating that clause 
expansively or narrowly,52 will naturally raise questions about why those 
arguments do not apply in principle to the other clause as well.  But the 
tendency to aim one’s critiques at one clause but not the other, or to find 
incoherent tendencies in the doctrine of both clauses but recommend very 
different and not necessarily reconcilable reforms for each of them, is not, I 
think, the unique to “secular egalitarians.”53  It applies across the board. 
Take one example—the primary example I wish to discuss.  At one 
time, Smith argues, the “American settlement” on church-state issues 
constructed “a complex, ongoing compromise on the potentially incendiary 
subject of religion.”54  The compromise was jurisdictional rather than 
universal or perfectly principled: “[M]ore providentialist positions might 
prevail at one time or in one jurisdiction; more secularist positions could be 
adopted at other times and in other jurisdictions.  School prayer could be 
(and was) forbidden in one state, permitted in another.”55   
Ultimately, according to this story, “the modern Supreme Court 
substantially undid the American settlement and reduced the possibilities of 
compromise by expanding the role of judge-enforced hard constitutional law 
 
 49.  Id. at 105; see, e.g., Leo Pfeffer, Religious Freedom and the American Community, 28 
JUDAISM 137, 142 (1979) (quoted in J. David Holcomb, Religion in Public Life: The “Pfefferian 
Inversion” Reconsidered, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 57, 60 n.20 (2009–2010)).  But see Jesse H. Choper, 
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 
673 (1980) (calling that tension “ineluctable,” despite the title of the article). 
 50.  See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (“Numerous cases considered by 
the Court have noted the internal tension in the First Amendment between the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 51.  See also Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against 
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 569–70 (1991) (“The tension 
[between the Religion Clauses] arises at the boundary between religion and nonreligion; the Free 
Exercise Clause suggests the privileging of religion over nonreligion, whereas the Establishment 
Clause suggests the normative equality of the two”).  See generally Choper, supra note 49. 
 52.  Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720–21 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(attributing the “‘tension’ between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment” that the majority “correctly acknowledges” in part on the Court’s “overly expansive 
interpretation of both Clauses”). 
 53.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 11.  
 54.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 122. 
 55.  Id. at 122–23. 
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in the domain of religion.”56  Smith would have us look back to the “soft 
constitutionalism” represented by the earlier “ongoing compromise” on 
religious matters,57 in which “constitutional questions [involving religion] 
could be argued, and different states and localities could reach their own 
conclusions.”58  This approach “worked,” Smith says.59  It did “what for 
centuries many had thought impossible—namely, to take a mass of 
individuals and groups embracing a multitude of different faiths and, without 
suppressing their differences, to hold them together as a single 
community.”60 
This is an interesting picture.  As presented, it is attractive enough.  It 
lacks the brittleness of the modern approach, whose sometimes dogmatic 
and overconfident insistence that “constitutional decisions must be 
‘principled’”61 ends up by demanding more from law and logic than they can 
reasonably be expected to provide, and reduces “opportunities for pragmatic 
compromise.”62  But I wonder about two aspects of this account.  
First, in what way did the “soft constitution” of religion work in the 
nineteenth century—or the “hard constitution” of the past 75 years or so not 
work?  Smith notes that the American landscape of the nineteenth century, 
with its “soft constitution” regime, featured the repression—sometimes 
“ugly, even violent” repression—of many members of minority faiths.63  He 
does not turn a blind eye to this history; he just offers a cheerier assessment 
of it.64  Of course everyone is entitled to his or her own interpretation of 
history, up to a point, and it is generally a good thing to unsettle historical 
narratives that we have taken to repeating by rote.  Still, must we accept that 
the nation that saw repeated anti-Catholic riots,65 governmental hounding of 
the Mormons,66 the order to expel Jews from Union-controlled regions of the 
 
 56.  Id. at 123. 
 57.  See SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 94–110. 
 58.  Id. at 100. 
 59.  Id. at 103. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 925. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 103. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300 (2001). 
 66.  See generally EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE 
COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830–1900 
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South,67 and the Trail of Tears68 really “became one (diverse and often 
turbulent) People?”69  Does “turbulent” really do it justice?  Did the violently 
quarrelsome people of our nation really earn that capital “P”? 
To apply Smith’s assessment of his counter-narrative elsewhere, if we 
can conclude that that settlement “worked,” then what should we make of 
the current state of American religious freedom?  I share many of Smith’s 
views about what is right and wrong with particular modern church-state 
court decisions and scholarly views.  Many of the cases that disappoint him 
disappoint me too, and we rejoice in some of the same decisions.  We are 
both critical of the current administration’s treatment of religious liberty.  
We agree that a slide into too thorough-going a form of secular 
egalitarianism, without a due regard for the claims of religious liberty and a 
strong interest in religious accommodation, even where it interferes with 
widely held secular goals, would be “deeply unfortunate.”70 
Even so, and despite the universalist nature of the claims made by 
secular egalitarians under a “hard constitution” model, compared to 
Philadelphia in the 1840s, things look pretty good.  The claims made by 
modern secular egalitarians in the area of religion are excessive, in my view, 
but they are still a long way from disastrous.  Failing to offer a generous 
enough set of accommodations for religious groups in the provision of 
health-care benefits including contraceptives or abortifacients, which may 
then be used or not by individual employees, is a long way from anti-
Catholic riots or the attempted expulsion of Jews from United States 
territory.  It is true that the logic of arguments made by some secular 
egalitarians today could extend further.  But not all of them accept all of 
these arguments, and not all of them are willing to be carried away entirely 
by mere logic in any event.  Nor, except through hindsight, would we have 
any reason to conclude that the “diverse and often turbulent” approach of the 
nineteenth century settlement would necessarily have turned out as well as it 
 
(1988). 
 67.  See JONATHAN D. SARNA & DAVID G. DALIN, RELIGION AND STATE IN THE AMERICAN 
JEWISH EXPERIENCE 131–32 (1997).  The order—issued by General Ulysses S. Grant—was 
countermanded by President Lincoln.  Id. 
 68.  See generally CLARA SUE KIDWELL ET AL., A NATIVE AMERICAN THEOLOGY 129–48 (2001) 
(discussing religious effects of removal of Native Americans from tribal lands); AMY H. STURGIS, 
THE TRAIL OF TEARS AND INDIAN REMOVAL (2006). 
 69.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 104. 
 70.  Id. at 141. 
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did.  “A page of history” is still “worth a volume of logic,” and the history of 
our own times is not yet written.71 
To be clear, Smith describes the current state of affairs as a threat to 
religious freedom, not a disaster.  Nor, to be sure, does he ignore the 
problems of the earlier era of soft constitutionalism.  Still, I think it is fair to 
say that a reader of this lecture, and of Smith’s book, will come away with a 
strong impression that he is quite optimistic about the American state of 
religious freedom under the earlier settlement and quite pessimistic about its 
prospects under modern conditions.  The earlier settlement worked, while 
the current one may be nearing its end.  “Religious freedom R.I.P.,” as he 
says.72  
I am not as convinced of this as Smith.  “Forced to choose between the 
standard and revised stories” of American religious freedom, Smith writes in 
his book, “I would favor the revised story as more illuminating, more 
perspicacious, ultimately more true.”73  Having been exposed to his critical 
treatment of the “standard story,” however, I find myself equally skeptical of 
the revised version.  Having been exposed to both narrative and counter-
narrative, I find myself questioning why we should be forced to choose, or at 
least whether we have any adequate basis for doing so. 
My second question has less to do with history than with consistency.  
Of course, one does not have to be a card-carrying Crit, if any are left, to 
look for inconsistencies and tensions in legal doctrine and theory.  But one 
point of this Response is that Smith himself, with his skillful critical 
approach, has helped accustom us to looking for inconsistencies and self-
subverting logic in church-state law and theory.  Once one starts looking, it 
is difficult to stop.  Smith argues that the “soft” constitutional approach 
works better in some ways than the “hard” one.  He suggests that “a better 
way of returning to a ‘softer’ constitutionalism would be through tightening 
up standing requirements, as recent decisions have done (arousing the ire of 
constitutional scholars).”74  As far as I can tell, however, his 
recommendations for tightened standing requirements are limited to the 
 
 71.  See N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
 72.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 905. 
 73.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 13. 
 74.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 926 n.93 (citing Steven D. Smith, 
Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 407 (2011) 
[hereinafter Smith, Soft Constitution]). 
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Establishment Clause alone.75  Why not bring “soft” constitutionalism back 
to the Free Exercise Clause as well?  One could do so by similarly tightening 
up standing requirements for that clause.  Or one might choose other means, 
such as demanding a serious personal burden before an individual can bring 
a viable Free Exercise claim, looking at such claims more skeptically at the 
threshold level than we currently do. 
It is true that many claims that might be viable under the Free Exercise 
Clause today, or under federal or state legislation applied “in accordance 
with received understandings of what the free exercise of religion means,”76 
might fail as a result.  If an Establishment Clause claim should not be 
sustainable for a mere “psychic injury or injury-by-observation,”77 as Smith 
suggests, then we might also hesitate before allowing a mere “psychic 
injury” to sustain a Free Exercise claim.  For various reasons, many claims 
brought against aspects of the Affordable Care Act might be among the 
losers.78  Beyond a certain point, the Obama administration does not appear 
willing to compromise on this issue at present, any more than nineteenth 
century American Protestants were willing to compromise with Catholics.  
But that might not be reason enough to reject this approach. After all, as 
Smith writes, “compromise on seemingly uncompromisable matters has 
been an essential component in the American political tradition.”79 
One possible explanation for the inconsistency80 is that the 
 
 75.  Perhaps I am mistaken.  But the article cited above, from which the discussion of soft 
constitutionalism in his recent book is drawn, mentions the Free Exercise Clause only in passing. 
 76.  Steven D. Smith & Caroline Mala Corbin, Debate, The Contraception Mandate and 
Religious Freedom, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 262 (2012).  
 77.  Smith, Soft Constitution, supra note 74, at 440. 
 78.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 
(U.S. Mar. 25, 2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/13-354_5436.pdf. 
 79.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 924. 
 80.  There is another answer, at least for matters covered by federal legislation such as the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)—which would include the contraceptive mandate 
provision of the Affordable Care Act—or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA): whatever the Free Exercise Clause itself might require, a compromise has been offered 
through that legislation, and it tilts the scales in favor of religious claimants.  My concern is mostly 
with the Religion Clauses themselves.  But if we accept this argument, I would think that Smith 
would then have a problem with RLUIPA, at least, to the degree that it imposes a particular religious 
freedom regime on the states.  Cf. Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal 
Sacrifice and Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 61 (1996) (arguing, with respect to the push for 
the RFRA legislation, that “conservative religious groups were willing to join an assault on self-
government and federalism in pursuit of a promise of preferential treatment.”).  Smith does appear, 
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Establishment Clause has more of a “jurisdictional” character than the Free 
Exercise Clause.  But that is a contested historical matter.81  Moreover, the 
decidedly mixed history of individual religious exercise in the nineteenth 
century suggests that the concept of free exercise of religion was no less 
“soft,” and no less varied across time and jurisdiction, than the concept of 
non-establishment. 
Furthermore, the reasons that Smith marshals in support of a “soft” 
Establishment Clause are not just historical in nature.  He argues that there is 
an underlying value to ongoing contestation and compromise itself, 
“turbulent” though the process may be.82  That value, it seems to me, applies 
to the Free Exercise Clause as well (or as poorly) as the Establishment 
Clause.  So, if we think soft constitutionalism is a valuable approach to 
church-state issues in general, then perhaps we ought to adopt it for both 
clauses, tightening up standards across the board for both Religion Clauses 
and handing matters back to the political process of multiple jurisdictions.  
Today, in one state, religious groups will lose the ability to fire sinful 
employees or refrain from subsidizing the use of abortifacients.  Tomorrow, 
in another state, the situation might be different.  
Another alternative, although a partial one, is to accept a more straitened 
Free Exercise Clause but insist that it still, at a minimum, requires the state 
not to discriminate against religion.  Take the current and controversial 
contraceptive mandate cases as an example.  One could argue that even if 
neutral and generally applicable laws give rise to no Free Exercise claim,83 
 
in any event, to believe that all that is required to make out a prima facie claim, “under both the Free 
Exercise Clause and RFRA, is whether a person [or employer] sincerely believes that compliance 
with [a law] would violate religious duties.”  Smith & Corbin, supra note 76, at 263 (emphasis in 
original).  If we can imagine returning to a “soft constitution” for the Establishment Clause by 
tightening up standing requirements, it is surely not beyond imagining that we could do the same 
thing for the Free Exercise by raising the necessary showing for a Free Exercise claim above this 
fairly undemanding threshold. 
 81.  For arguments that the Establishment Clause, at least as it was incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment if not before, is and was intended to be just as national in scope as any other 
right so incorporated, see, for example, Steven K. Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in 
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717, 1720–28 (2006); Steven K. 
Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 
774–80 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the 
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1088 (1995) (“To the extent that incorporation 
of any right can be justified as a matter of historical intent, there is no less reason to incorporate the 
Establishment Clause than any other provision in the First Amendment.”). 
 82.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 104. 
 83.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1991). 
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thus returning more free exercise controversies to the realm of politics and 
the “soft constitution,” the contraceptive mandate itself “is riddled with such 
substantial exceptions that it cannot be regarded as a neutral law of general 
applicability.”84 
But that is not a wholly satisfying answer.  For one thing, if one is going 
to take a broad view of what constitutes discrimination for Free Exercise 
purposes, then one might believe that similar treatment is needed for claims 
under the Establishment Clause.  Some treatments of current Free Exercise 
doctrine by both courts and scholars suggest that once a law makes 
exceptions for other situations, someone who is denied a religious 
accommodation from the same law is entitled to receive strict judicial 
scrutiny of that denial.85  On this view, whenever “the legislature enacts 
underinclusive laws and thereby chooses to accommodate certain ‘harmful’ 
secular conduct but not ‘harmful’ religious conduct, it is the duty of courts to 
intervene and protect the free exercise of religion” by applying strict 
scrutiny.86  Judges who apply this rule broadly and skillfully may “find they 
have significant flexibility to relieve religious actors from laws or policies 
that appear to be neutral and generally applicable.”87 
But if we apply such a rule to the Free Exercise Clause, and if—as most 
scholars and judges seem to agree—the Establishment Clause forbids at least 
some forms of discrimination, then surely we should end up with a stricter 
Establishment Clause as well.  Surely a government that makes or mandates 
some forms of religious expression—school prayer, a Ten Commandments 
display, a Christian cross at a memorial site—but does not allow or provide 
for expressions of other faiths, or for non- or anti-religious expressions,, 
gives rise to the same suspicions of discrimination that would be triggered 
under a similar reading of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Moreover, as Smith has recognized here and elsewhere, this whole 
enterprise of relying on “discrimination” or “inequality” to salvage the Free 
Exercise Clause is fraught with conceptual thinness and practical difficulty.  
As he writes, and I agree, “the concept of equality has no universal or 
 
 84.  Smith & Corbin, supra note 76, at 261. 
 85.  See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055, 2058–59 
(2011). 
 86.  Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and 
the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 875 (2001). 
 87.  Tebbe, supra note 86, at 2059.  
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intrinsic substantive content or implications.”88  It “surely does not entail the 
absurd notion that all persons, situations, and cases must always be treated in 
exactly the same way.”89  Critical analysis—the same critical analysis that 
reveals that the secular egalitarians’ appeals to the principle of equality rests 
on an unclear foundation—suggests that an attempt to salvage claims under 
the Free Exercise Clause, in the face of ostensibly neutral and generally 
applicable laws, by appealing to a principle of non-discrimination will be 
deeply troubled if not incoherent.90 
My point, in sum, is this: It is Smith’s finely honed critical sensibility 
that allows us to see problems with various central concepts of current 
Religion Clause doctrine and theory—“neutrality,” “equality,” 
“nondiscrimination,” and so on.  He clears the ground for a return to a 
jurisdictional or soft constitutional approach to (at least one of) the Religion 
Clauses, or reveals current approaches to be so problematic that it is at least 
worth thinking about doing so.  In that sense, and acknowledging the 
crudeness of such labels, it shows that a critical sensibility can lead to 
proposals for new or revived approaches that appeal to the (religious) Right, 
not just the (secular) Left.  But the same critical sensibility should also lead 
us to wonder whether those approaches are not ultimately equally 
inconsistent, incoherent, or unattractive.  Without all the folderol about 
Critical Legal Studies, Alan Brownstein makes the point bluntly and well: 
“[C]ommentators supporting a rigorously enforced Free Exercise Clause but 
a diminished Establishment Clause, or vice versa, are likely to discover that 
their critiques of one clause have severely undermined the other.”91 
One answer to this, of course, is to favor something like a “soft 
constitutional” approach for both clauses, one that returns more disputes 
 
 88.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 916.  See generally Peter Westen, The Empty 
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
 89.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 916; see also Steven D. Smith, Religious 
Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May Be a Greater Loss Now Than It Was 
Then, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2033, 2049 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, Religious Freedom] (“Live 
disagreements are not over whether people should be treated equally, but over what counts as equal 
or unequal treatment—over what factors and considerations are morally and legally relevant.”). 
 90.  See generally Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 
U. COLO. L. REV. 519 (1994). 
 91.  Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses As Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the 
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are 
Stronger When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1705–06 (2011).  
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over both clauses to the political process.92  Under current doctrine, that 
would mean supporting an Establishment Clause with tighter standing 
requirements that leans more closely to the jurisdictional model, while 
accepting the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 
which eliminated a right to a judicially compelled accommodation for 
religious claimants in the face of neutral and generally applicable laws.93 
In fact, that approach seems to be gaining traction.  When it was issued, 
Smith was the target of sustained and emphatic criticism from many church-
state scholars holding various political views.94  In recent years, however, it 
seems to me that we have witnessed a growing reconciliation with Smith.  
Obviously the “secular egalitarians” always favored it.  But, increasingly, so 
do what we might label the “religious conservatives.”95  If they are not 
strongly in favor of Smith, more of them are at least “relatively blasé” about 
it.96  Although religious conservatives still champion religious freedom, they 
also believe that Smith’s criticisms of judicially mandated religious 
accommodations from neutral, generally applicable laws raised important 
concerns about “institutional competence, comparative advantage, 
federalism, and the limits of judicial review.”97  As a matter of my own 
understanding of the Religion Clauses, I do not favor that approach.  But it 
at least has the apparent virtue of consistency. 
As I understand him, Smith himself does not favor Smith.  If anything, 
as the title of a recent article of his suggests, he believes it “may be a greater 
loss now than it was then.”98  Both because of the problems with that 
decision and the supporting concepts—such as equality, neutrality, and 
general applicability—that a critical examination reveals, and because of the 
general rise of expansive secular egalitarian laws and sentiments, Smith 
 
 92.  Another, the one I tend to favor, emphasizes a “strong” Free Exercise Clause and a strong 
Establishment Clause.  I suspect it is equally subject to some of the questions raised in the rest of this 
Article.  
 93.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1991). 
 94.  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1815, 1815–16 (2011). 
 95.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 11; see also Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra 
note 19, at 916–17. 
 96.  Garnett, supra note 94, at 1817.  I draw heavily on Garnett’s article here, but I do not think 
he is the only person typically associated with conservatism who has come around to some degree on 
Smith, with the important caveats noted below.  
 97.  Garnett, supra note 94, at 1821. 
 98.  Smith, Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 2033. 
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believes that Smith is unlikely to protect us against ongoing threats to 
religious exercise.99  I agree with him.  But, again, I wonder why a regime of 
judicial accommodations is not subject to the same critical analysis that 
Smith deploys to undermine modern Establishment Clause doctrine, and to 
the same suggestions that we tighten up standing requirements significantly. 
Is favoring both Smith and a weaker or “soft” Establishment Clause 
more consistent and less subject to this kind of heightening of 
contradictions?  Yes—and no.  Here, the critical analysis is not so much 
about revealing direct contradictions or tensions between the two positions.  
Instead, it is about noticing all the “shoring up” work that this move 
requires, for those who would like to have Smith and a softer Establishment 
Clause—without giving up such things as the right of religious organizations 
to “discriminate.” 
One such technique we have already seen is the insistence that even 
under the Smith regime, in which we “give to the political processes the bulk 
of the work of accommodating religion,” courts “can and should [still] 
enforce a no-discrimination-against-religion rule.”100  For example, such a 
rule would require that, due to the existence of some exceptions to the 
contraceptive mandate in the ACA, any failure to provide full religious 
accommodation must be subject to strict scrutiny.  But it seems to me that 
Smith’s critiques of equality and discrimination are applicable here, and that 
the expansive use of the neutrality and general applicability requirement of 
Smith to smoke out “discrimination” raises the same questions about 
“institutional competence” and “the limits of judicial review” that have led 
some to make peace with the Smith decision in the first place.101 
The other salvaging technique is, in effect, the “freedom of the church” 
or “church autonomy” approach itself.  On this view, even after Smith, the 
courts—not the political process, but the courts themselves—must insist 
upon and enforce the idea that “the right to religious freedom includes the 
freedom of religious communities to govern themselves with respect to 
 
 99.  See id. at 2053. 
 100.  Garnett, supra note 94, at 1825–26. 
 101.  Id. at 1824.  In correspondence with me, I should note, Professor Garnett has suggested that 
there is an important difference between judicial competence to smoke out discrimination in a statute 
or other governmental action, and judicial competence to balance the general costs, benefits, and 
scope of a possible accommodation of religious objections to a generally applicable statute. I think 
he is right about this, although I think a thoroughgoing “Crit” would conclude that the difference is 
one of degree, not kind. 
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matters of doctrine, discipline, and polity.”102  As the writer of these words 
(with which I agree, I hasten to add), Rick Garnett adds, “This last point is 
crucial.”103  
And so it is.  For a variety of reasons that Smith canvasses, church 
autonomy is in some trouble these days, although not completely.  The 
Supreme Court’s unanimous affirmation of the “ministerial exception” in 
Hosanna-Tabor,104 with its strong statement that the First Amendment “gives 
special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,”105 indicates that 
some support for some version of “freedom of the church” is likely to 
continue for some time.106  Yet a number of factors mentioned by Smith 
suggest that it will face increasing resistance or indifference. Those factors 
include increasing skepticism about whether “special protection for religious 
freedom” can be justified in principle;107 what Smith calls generally “the 
challenge of modern equality;”108 the sheer number of active faiths in the 
United States, which heightens the concerns about anarchy offered by 
Justice Scalia in Smith;109 scandals involving the churches themselves;110 and 
changes in our “surrounding political culture,” such as the rise of religious 
believers with little commitment to a particular church and the increase in 
popular support for gay rights and women’s equality.111  One might add to 
this the likelihood that some of those “religious conservatives who reject 
constitutional commitments” that Smith mentions—recall that they are the 
ones he describes as posing less of a threat to religious freedom than secular 
egalitarians112—might well prefer a highly narrow version of church 
autonomy, or an absolute rule subjecting churches to the force of law on an 
 
 102.  Id. at 1827. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 105.  Id. at 706. 
 106.  Cf. Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
59, 128 (arguing that, “[s]omewhat counter-intuitively, freedom of the church [in the United States] 
today is on a stronger footing precisely because it has become so chastened and reduced.”). 
 107.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 904. 
 108.  Id. at 912–18. 
 109.  See id. at 932–33; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1991). 
 110.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 19, at 932. 
 111.  See id. at 114 (citing, inter alia, Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of 
Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 422 (2011)). 
 112.  SMITH, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 11 (suggesting that religious conservatives 
pose less of a threat to religious freedom than secular egalitarians).  I do not necessarily disagree 
with this assessment, although I would note that it takes two to hold a culture war. 
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equal basis with everyone else, since that position would arm them with a 
basis to reject such things as the use of shari’a in interpreting or arbitrating 
Islamic contracts.113  
So there are reasons to think church autonomy is in an unsettled 
position.  For the reasons Smith has discussed elsewhere, those concerns are 
heightened under a regime of neutrality and general applicability, with all 
the questions and uncertainties that Smith’s critical analysis of those 
concepts produces.  Although the ministerial exception survived easily in 
Hosanna-Tabor, he is still correct that “[t]he difficulty of squaring even the 
minimal so-called ‘ministerial exception from employment discrimination 
laws,” let alone more vigorous protections for churches or religious 
employers, “with current Religion Clause doctrines reflects the 
unresponsiveness of those doctrines to emerging challenges.”114 
We can thus understand why, for those who support a weakened 
Establishment Clause and a weakened Free Exercise Clause, but still want 
judges to protect the institutional rights of churches, some freestanding 
judicially enforceable notion of “freedom of the church” is “crucial.”115  
Viewed in this light, it may be seen less as a revival or reaffirmation of an 
idea that has been around for some time but obscured by other 
developments, or as an intriguing counter-narrative, and more as a salvaging 
technique.  From this perspective, “freedom of the church” becomes a kind 
of saving construction of the Religion Clauses.  It returns some church-state 
issues to the political process—whether to have school prayer or Ten 
Commandments displays, for instance—while holding back a trump card to 
play against antidiscrimination laws.  This possibility calls to mind another 
aspect of Critical Legal Studies, although one that is hardly unique to that 
school of thought: the conclusion that “law is politics, all the way down.”116 
 
 113.  See, e.g., Jaron Ballou, Sooners v. Shari’a: The Constitutional and Societal Problems Raised 
by the Oklahoma State Ban on Islamic Shari’a Law, 30 LAW & INEQ. 309, 315–19, 333–36 (2012).  
See generally Paul Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, Not Abandoning It: A Comment on “Overlapping 
Jurisdictions”, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 351 (2013). 
 114.  Smith, Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 2053. 
 115.  Garnett, supra note 94, at 1827. 
 116.  Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1539.  Although I say it more than once in the text above, I should 
emphasize that I accuse no particular individual, including both Smith and Garnett, of conscious bad 
faith here.  I assume that their arguments about both church autonomy and the “soft constitution” 
version of the Establishment Clause constitute their best understanding of what the Religion Clauses, 
properly interpreted, demand.  To say that law is politics is not necessarily the same thing as saying 
that law is nothing but politics, or that legal practitioners are nakedly political.  From a strictly 
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Presented so baldly, the idea that law is politics is a banal insight, one 
that is now widely accepted in the legal academy117  My point is not to 
lambaste those who are intrigued by the notion of church autonomy; I am 
one of those people.  Nor is it to make an accusation of bad faith against 
those who, unlike me (or Smith), support church autonomy and are 
becoming reconciled to the Smith decision.  There are good reasons to 
become reconciled to Smith, or at least to find it less troubling than its critics 
initially thought. 
Still, I wonder whether a “revised version” of American religious 
freedom that retains Smith, but tries to maintain freedom of the church as a 
dike against “secular egalitarianism” or antidiscrimination laws, will 
succeed.  More particularly, I wonder what happens once we accept the 
kinds of arguments that Smith so skillfully deploys about the incoherence or 
insufficiency of many guiding concepts in church-state legal doctrine.  Smith 
does an excellent job of showing why those concepts have trouble doing all 
the work that is demanded of them: why those rules promise stability, 
predictability, and judicial manageability but cannot fully deliver.  I suspect 
that if we applied the same critical tools and insights to the proposed 
alternatives that I have discussed here, we would find that taking a “soft 
constitution” approach to the Establishment Clause but not the Free Exercise 
Clause, or retrieving some notion of freedom of the church, are subject to 
similar instabilities.  That may be an unfortunate or unsettling outcome, but 
we are obliged to apply the same critical tools across the board nevertheless. 
 
external perspective, however, I do worry about the “salvaging” role that strong support for a 
judicially enforceable notion of church autonomy may play when combined with arguments for a 
“soft” approach to the Establishment Clause and growing support for the rule in Smith.  
 117.  See id. 
